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PRICE ENHANCEMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT
Market Report
Yr
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 3/10/00
Livestock and Products,
 Average Prices for Week Ending
Slaughter Steers, Ch. 204, 1100-1300 lb
  Omaha, cwt.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame, 600-650 lb
  Dodge City, KS, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame 600-650 lb,
   Nebraska Auction Wght. Avg. . . . . . . .
Carcass Price, Ch. 1-3, 550-700 lb
  Cent. US, Equiv. Index Value, cwt.. . . .
Hogs, US 1-2, 220-230 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, US 1-2, 40-45 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, hd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vacuum Packed Pork Loins, Wholesale,  
   13-19 lb, 1/4" Trim, Cent. US, cwt. . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 115-125 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carcass Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 1-4, 55-65 lb
  FOB Midwest, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
*
79.68
82.07
97.48
24.75
40.50
82.88
*
150.00
68.88
93.44
97.97
106.44
37.50
53.00
109.65
68.25
153.00
70.66
93.07
98.67
110.44
40.88
57.50
107.60
*
170.00
Crops,
 Cash Truck Prices for Date Shown
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Kansas City, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Sioux City, IA , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.86
1.97
4.40
3.41
1.24
3.04
2.00
4.80
3.37
1.24
2.87
2.00
4.84
3.45
1.32
Hay,
 First Day of Week Pile Prices
Alfalfa, Sm. Square, RFV 150 or better
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Lg. Round, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . .
Prairie, Sm. Square, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . .
*
42.50
62.50
97.50
32.50
45.00
87.50
82.50
*
* No market.
In the recent 2000 Corn-Soybean Expo Marketing
workshops participants were given an opportunity to
market corn and compare their decisions with others. The
workshop is described below, along with some of what we
learned. Participants were asked to decide whether they
wanted to purchase CRC multi-peril crop insurance and
how much corn they wanted to cash forward contract from
early April to late July for harvest-time delivery. For
workshops in predominately irrigated areas, participants
were given past corn yields for a 500-acre farm with a 10-
year average yield of 165 bushels per acre based on actual
yields from a University of Nebraska farm near Clay
Center. Corn production that wasn't forward priced would
be sold at harvest and any shortfall of contracted produc-
tion would have to be purchased at 5 cents above the
harvest cash price. Cash forward prices were announced to
participants two weeks at a time up to the end of July.
Cash forward commitments were collected before the next
price was announced. The actual year was not announced
until harvest time. At that time the yield and harvest cash
price were announced, using 1990 prices and yields.
The results for the decisions made by the top 20
participants in one of the workshops are summarized in the
following table. The top marketer (highest sales receipts
net of insurance premium) priced 80,000 bushels (500
acres at a 165-bushel average is 82,500 bushels), and did
not take out crop insurance (0 in the Ins. column). Since in
1990 the spring and early summer price levels exceeded
harvest prices by more than the 5-cent premium required
to make up any production shortfall of contracted bushels,
the greater the bushels forward contracted the greater the
income. Hence, cash forward pricing 45,000 bushels
resulted in sacrificing more than $25,000 ($227,570 for the
top marketer compared to $201,070 for the 20th ranked
marketer). The general price pattern in 1990 is similar to
the long-term average price pattern with prices at harvest 
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Table 1.
1983 - 1999
1990
Net$
Fwd
$/bu.ID# Ins. Bu. Fwd. Ave$ Rank    Worst Year
303 0 80,000 227,570 206,774 2* 1993 89,275 2.31
231 1 80,000 222,485 205,178 7* 1993 124,144 2.31
186 1 82,000 214,535 205,402 6* 1993 122,954 2.31
92 0 80,000 213,420 206,785 1* 1993 87,775 2.31
114 1 85,000 211,335 205,533 5* 1993 121,994 2.31
97 1 70,000 211,085 204,619 11* 1993 128,644 2.31
44 0 70,000 210,920 205,968 3* 1993 93,025 2.31
162 1 65,000 209,635 204,126 14* 1993 130,294 2.31
60 0 65,000 209,420 205,643 4* 1993 95,175 2.31
204 1 64,000 208,535 204,081 17 1993 130,974 2.31
98 1 70,000 207,585 204,231 13 1993 127,844 2.31
95 0 60,000 206,740 205,059 8 1993 97,605 2.31
82 1 75,000 206,035 204,786 9* 1993 126,494 2.31
3 1 60,000 204,485 203,700 23* 1993 132,394 2.31
115 1 65,000 203,485 203,950 20 1993 130,694 2.31
25 1 60,000 203,185 203,664 24* 1993 133,044 2.31
77 1 67,000 202,785 204,012 18 1993 128,884 2.31
193 1 70,000 201,685 204,783 10* 1993 127,794 2.32
190 1 60,000 201,405 203,448 27 1993 132,124 2.31
219 0 45,000 201,070 203,921 21 1993 104,050 2.32
that are below price levels in the spring and early summer.
Perhaps two reasons producers may not take advantage of
this historical pattern are: 1) fear of not producing con-
tracted bushels, and 2) optimism that prices will go higher.
CRC insurance is designed to provide protection when
forward pricing. In particular, protection increases as crop
prices increase, so if less is produced than is insured and
prices increase, the shortfall will generate an indemnity
payment at the higher prices. Therefore, CRC can be used
to provide protection against having to purchase contract
shortfalls at higher prices. The impact of CRC insurance
is illustrated in the following graph. The graph displays
the result of applying the same market timing in 1983-99
as was used in 1990. It would appear one could do better
making decisions on an individual year basis, but that may
be a topic for a later workshop. One of the interesting
results that follows from a comparison of the various
strategies used by participants is timing within the spring
and early summer is relatively unimportant compared to
the impact the total bushels forward contracted has on the
outcome. For example, the 1983-99 average and the worst
year returns for those not buying insurance are circled in
the graph. The extreme left point in that group did not
forward price grain (0 Fwd); therefore, everything was
sold at harvest. Moving to the right among that group are
individuals that forward contracted increasing amounts
and as a result realized a higher average return but a lower
return in their worst year, i.e., they increased returns at
greater downside risk.
The highest average return with insurance was realized
by ID#114 who ranked Number 5 in 1990. The points to
the left of ID#114 in the graph are others that purchased
insurance but forward priced less than ID#114. Similar to
the group that did not take crop insurance, moving to the
right among the insured group are individuals who gener-
ally forward contracted increasing amounts (some excep-
tions resulted from differences in timing) and realized
higher average returns and lower return in their worst year.
Any outcome up and to the left in the graph would be
preferred by most of us, i.e., a higher average return and a
worst year that has a higher return. For example, the
outcome realized by Participant #114  is a higher average
return and is less downside risk than 0 forward contracting
without insurance.
Why not forget about insurance and aggressively
forward contract? The answer may be at some point that
worst year is a disaster. If, for example, $100,000 is
needed to avoid having to liquidate part of the farm or
refinance, the strategy followed by Participant #114 would
be preferred over any of the strategies pursued by those
without insurance if a year below $100,000 is unaccept-
able. Projecting cash needs and determining which cash
commitments must be met to avoid catastrophe is an
approach to risk management that we have discussed in
earlier issues. As illustrated in the graph, crop insurance
enables a producer to forward price more aggressively,
increasing expected returns without the downside risk that 
would be faced without insurance. Note that if the
additional risk is acceptable, for example, if a worst year
of $85,000 is acceptable, a greater average return can be
realized without insurance and aggressive forward pricing.
Buying insurance shifts unwanted risk to the insurance
company, but at the cost of foregone profit (and loss)
opportunities.
As shown in the table, the top 10 performers in 1990
were also well represented among the top performers over
the years 1983-99 (the top 7 plus 11th, 14th and 17th). This
result follows from the 1990 price pattern being similar to
the longer-term price pattern. The asterisk next to the
1983-99 rank indicates those strategies that form a set of
best strategies. Any strategy without an asterisk has a
lower average return and greater downside risk (lower
worst year) than one or more of the strategies flagged with
an asterisk. For example, the strategy of 0 forward con-
tracting without crop insurance earlier identified in the
graph is not one of the best strategies because again the
strategy followed by Participant #114 has both a higher
average return and a worst year with a higher return.
Finally, a striking characteristic of these strategies is,
in spite of a wide variety of marketing patterns over time,
the average price received for grain forward priced is
essentially the same for all participants (see the last
column Fwd $/bu). Conclusion: The critical pricing
decision in this exercise was how much to forward price,
not when to forward price. 
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